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Abstract
Addressing the determinants of non-communicable diseases (NCDs) is challenged by aggressive market 
promotion by tobacco, alcohol and unhealthy food industries in emerging countries with fast economic 
development; and interference by these industries in government policies aimed at containing consumption of 
unhealthy products. This editorial reviews market promotion and industry interference and classifies them into 
four groups of tactics: (a) interfering with the legislative process; (b) using front groups to act on their behalf; 
(c) questioning the evidence of tobacco harm and the effectiveness of harm-reduction interventions; and (d) 
appearing responsible in the eyes of the public, journalists and policy-makers. Despite active implementation 
of the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC), the tobacco, alcohol and unhealthy food industries 
use similar tactics to aggressively interfere in policies, with the tobacco industry being the most aggressive. 
Policy interference by industries are effective in the context of poor governance, rampant corruption, conflict 
of interest among political and government actors, and regulatory capture in all levels of countries from low- to 
high-income. In addressing these interferences, government requires the practice of good governance, effective 
mechanisms to counteract conflict of interests among political and policy actors, and prevention of regulatory 
capture. The World Health Organization (WHO) Framework of Engagement with non-State Actors can be 
applied to the country context when engaging private entities in the prevention and control of NCDs. 
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Introduction 
In the context of trade liberalization, which promotes the 
availability and consumption of goods and services through 
reduction of taxes and tariffs, the increased consumption of 
alcohol, unhealthy foods, and breast milk substitutes (BMS) is 
boosted by aggressive market promotion. This is particularly 
so in countries with fast economic growth and increasing 
household disposal income. Governments’ efforts to prevent 
and control non-communicable diseases (NCDs) through 
increased tax and price, and controlled advertising of these 
products are hampered by policy interference by alcohol, 
tobacco, and unhealthy food industries.1
In response to the complex intersection between trade and 
health, the World Health Assembly Resolution WHA59.26 
on International Trade and Health2 urges Member States to 
convene multi-stakeholder dialogue using a national platform 
for harmonizing sectoral policies and preventing negative 
trade impacts on the health of the population. Progress has 
been slow as it was limited by the lack of capacity in the health 
sector to convene partnerships with trade and commerce, to 
generate evidence for policy, and to track the implications of 
trade agreements relating to the health of the population.3 
Furthermore, government policies to contain NCDs such as 
taxes, labeling with health warnings, and restricted advertising 
and marketing are often interfered by industries; this hampers 
the primary prevention of NCDs. 
Alcohol use was the seventh leading risk factor for 2.2% 
(95% uncertainty interval [UI] 1.5–3.0) of age-standardized 
female deaths and 6.8% (5.8–8.0) of age standardized male 
deaths in 2016. Mortality impact is much higher among prime 
adults (15-49 years old). The study concludes that the level 
of alcohol consumption that minimizes harm across health 
outcomes is zero standard drinks per week.4
To tackle the determinants of NCDs, the World Health 
Organization (WHO) suggests some ‘best buy’ interventions. 
These are defined through an average cost-effectiveness 
ratio of international dollars ≤100 per disability-adjusted life 
years averted in low- and lower middle-income countries.5 
A systematic review shows that tobacco warnings increase 
people’s attention to and recall of health messages, which 
ultimately reduces smoking and motivates quitting.6 Graphic 
pictures enhance the effectiveness of warning labels.7 A 
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randomized control trial among Dutch children shows that 
sugar sweetened beverage (SSB) intake affects relative weight.8 
In a systematic review, the own-price elasticity for soft drinks 
is -1.30 (95% CI: -1.09 to -1.51)9; which indicates that for 
every one percent increase in SSB price, its demand drops 
by 1.3%. Evidence shows that 20% SSB tax in Australia is 
likely to decrease SSB purchase and consumption, leading to 
significant health gains and healthcare expenditure savings.10 
In California,11 SSB taxes are effective in shifting consumers 
to purchase healthier beverages without causing undue 
economic hardship, while raising revenue for social objectives. 
One-cent-per-ounce excise tax on SSB implemented across 
the United States would have prevented nearly 580 000 cases 
of childhood obesity and more than US$30 in health care cost 
savings for every US$1 investment.12
This editorial reviews evidence on market promotion 
and policy interference by tobacco, alcohol and food 
industries when governments introduce measures to contain 
consumption of these products in order to prevent and 
control NCDs; and suggests how governments might find 
ways to overcome these challenges. 
Emerging Countries: Targets of Market Promotion and 
Health Implications
Emerging countries in Asia had the highest gross domestic 
product (GDP) growth rate between 2008 and 2017 at an 
average of 7.2%; more than double the world’s 3.2% average 
(see Table). The European Union had a 0.7% ten-year average 
growth. Emerging countries are therefore the best targets for 
market promotion of tobacco, alcohol, BMS and SSB.
Worldwide, more than one-fifth of the adult population 
smokes, consuming 5500 billion cigarettes in 2017. Excluding 
China which has 43% of global market share, the global 
tobacco market in 2017 was worth US$760 billion. More than 
US$680 billion was from sales of conventional cigarettes and 
the remaining market of “Next Generation Products” was 
predicted to double between 2016 and 2021.13,14
The value of the global alcoholic beverages market was 
US$1439 billion in 2017, and is expected to reach US$1684 
billion by 2025. The compound annual growth rate was 
2% between 2018 and 2025.15 The alcohol market is driven 
by increased growth in the middle classes and those with 
disposable incomes, and demand for premium product 
brands. Flavored alcoholic beverages have also boosted 
market growth.16
Asia is the fastest-growing alcohol market, with more than 
30% of global sales in 2014, with a growth of 176% between 
2000 and 2019.17 Active market promotion in Asia results in 
significant increases in alcohol consumption among youth.18
A systematic review demonstrates a positive association 
between level of exposure to alcohol marketing and initiation, 
consumption, and binge consumption among youth. Market 
promotion increases youth’s brand recognition and receptivity 
to alcohol.19 
The global market size of carbonated soft drinks was 
US$392.6 billion in 2016, boosted by increased consumer 
disposable income and extensive distribution channels.20 A 
greater consumption of SSB is associated with weight gain 
and obesity.21,22 In Asia, young and middle to upper-income 
women in major cities are also increasingly purchasing and 
drinking alcoholic drinks.23
In the United kingdom, top food companies spent more 
than £143 million on product advertising in 2016. The 
advertising spending was 27.5 times the £5.2 million that 
the Government spent on a healthy eating campaign, such as 
‘Change for life.’24 
The global market of BMS grew by 40.8% between 2008 and 
2013, mostly in East Asian emerging market such as China, 
Indonesia, Thailand, and Vietnam. It grew from 5.5 to 7.8 kg 
BMS per infant or child per year; and was predicted to increase 
to 10.8 kg BMS by 2018. The aggressive marketing of BMS 
contributes to sub-optimal breastfeeding and adverse effects 
on child and maternal health outcomes.25 Not providing 
breastfeeding is associated with lower intelligence, delayed 
cognitive development and economic losses of about US$302 
billion annually or 0.49% of world gross national income.26 
Exclusive breastfeeding of newborns for 6 months in China 
went down steadily from 67% in 1998 to 50.8% in 2003, 27.6% 
in 2008 and 18.6% in 2013. 
Industry Interferences 
When governments introduce tough measures against NCD 
Table. World’s GDP Growth by Region Between 2008 and 2017 by Percent
Country Group Name 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Average Growth 2008-2017 
Emerging and developing Asia 7.2 7.5 9.6 7.8 6.9 6.9 6.8 6.6 6.4 6.3 7.2
ASEANa 5.4 2.4 6.9 4.7 6.2 5.1 4.6 4.8 4.8 5.1 5
Emerging market and developing economies 5.8 3 7.4 6.3 5.3 4.9 4.6 4 4.1 4.6 5
Sub-Saharan Africa 6 4 6.6 5 4.3 5.2 5.1 3.4 3 4 4.7
World 3 -0.1 5.4 4.2 3.5 3.3 3.4 3.1 3.2 3.5 3.2
Emerging and developing Europe 3.1 -3 4.7 5.4 1.2 2.8 2.8 3.5 3.5 3.3 2.7
Advanced economies 0.2 -3.4 3.1 1.7 1.2 1.2 1.8 1.9 1.9 2 1.1
European Union 0.7 -4.3 2 1.8 -0.4 0.3 1.4 2 1.8 1.9 0.7
Abbreviation: GDP, gross domestic product.
a Including Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Vietnam, and Thailand 
Source: Obiols M. 2017 World’s GDP Growth by Region 2017. https://bit.ly/2PW3CFs. Accessed November 17, 2017.
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risk factors, the tobacco,27-29 alcohol,30 food and beverage 
industries31 – including their proxies – interfere with public 
policy development.
Article 5.3 of the Framework Convention on Tobacco 
Control (FCTC) states: “In setting and implementing their 
public health policies with respect to tobacco control, Parties 
shall act to protect these policies from commercial and other 
vested interests of the tobacco industry in accordance with 
national law.” This serves as a foundation for State Parties 
to keep vigilance and safeguard themselves from undue 
influences by tobacco industry. This good practice can be 
applied to other harmful products. 
Tobacco Industry 
The tobacco industry applies legal threats and files law suits 
against governments.32-35 In emerging African markets, their 
petition to Kenya’s high court against the Government’s 
proposed tobacco regulations on April 16, 2015 was critical, 
saying, “Kenya’s proposal for a new 2% tax on tobacco products 
is arbitrary and capricious; it will have a significant effect on 
cigarette manufacturers and importers putting at risk further 
investment, direct and indirect employment opportunities 
in Kenya.” In Uganda, the tobacco industry’s petition in 
the constitutional court against the Tobacco Control Act 
commented the following: “The Tobacco Control Act, read as 
a whole, has the effect of unjustifiably singling out the tobacco 
industry for discriminative treatment.”
To counteract a government’s ban on point-of-sales 
advertising, the industry uses a few counteracting messages. 
For example, it costs retailers a significant amount to remodel 
their store or face lost sales as customers buy tobacco 
elsewhere. Experiences show such bans do not work; it simply 
does not reduce smoking and bans on point-of-sale display 
are anti-competitive. Tobacco representatives offer retailers 
financial, ‘loyalty’ or ‘reward’ schemes36 to boost sales volume. 
To counteract government’s increased size of health 
warning label, the tobacco industry applies several tactics. 
The 30% of package areas are sufficient to fulfill FCTC 
minimum requirements. The oversized, shocking warning 
does not reduce smoking rates.37 The example of Sweden 
raised by the industry provides a half-truth; packages apply 
a text warning only but there is only a very low smoking rate 
at 13%. The distorted message does not capture other strong 
control measures in Sweden. Spain applies a graphic warning 
but the smoking rate is 33%. 
The tobacco industry infiltration into the sessions of 
Conference of Parties (COP) of the FCTC has led to the 
tighter screening of members of the public and amendments 
of the Rule of Procedure of the COP to allow only accredited, 
properly vetted representatives of the media to attend the 
‘open’ COP discussions and clarify which of the subsidiary 
body meetings are restricted or public.38 
The tobacco industry has interpreted that Article 6 on the 
guidelines on price and tax measures to reduce the demand 
for tobacco adopted by COP 6 (2014)39 to be a non-legally 
binding instrument. They see it as the sovereign right of 
State Parties to determine their tobacco tax policies, where 
affordability is a key consideration in setting tobacco tax. 
Alcohol Industry 
The alcohol industry interfered with the National Institute of 
Health (NIH)-initiated Moderate Alcohol and Cardiovascular 
Health trial by providing funding support without due 
process. This multi-centre randomized clinical trial aimed 
to determine the effects of one alcohol serving daily on 
cardiovascular and diabetes outcomes compared with a 
no alcohol intake group. Industry funding to the Moderate 
Alcohol and Cardiovascular Health study cast doubt over the 
scientific integrity and the trial’s independence from industry 
influence. This irregularity led to the NIH’s decision to 
terminate the study.40
The alcohol industry is highly effective and well organized 
in gaining access to the policy making process including 
public consultations, parliamentary committees and working 
groups. They build close relationships with policy actors 
such as ministers, political and technical advisors, civil 
servants officers, members of parliaments, and other political 
representatives. These approaches minimize threats to their 
commercial interests.41 
The alcohol industry casts doubt on a wealth of scientific 
evidence, promoting weak survey-based evidence, and 
making unsubstantiated claims to their advantage.42 They 
invest in research on issues where they have clear vested 
interests in the outcomes. A systematic review identified 
serious concerns about the inherent conflict of interest 
between the commercial goals of industry actors and the 
production and dissemination of public health research.43 
The International Center for Alcohol Policies, supported by 
the industry, not only counters WHO recommendations and 
refutes evidence on the most effective strategies to prevent 
alcohol-related harm; its recommended alcohol policies are 
congenial to industry interests.44
Unhealthy Food Industry
When Thailand introduced SSB tax45 in 2017 to address 
obesity, the Government faced serious resistance from the 
soft drink industry. The Thai Beverage Industry Association 
questioned the link between obesity and drinking sweetened 
beverages.46
In the United States, the beverage industry pressured 
California lawmakers, where there are SSB taxes in four cities, 
for a 12-year moratorium on local SSB taxes. Lawmakers 
were held “hostage” by the beverage industry, which spent 
$7 million on a ballot initiative and campaign which would 
have made it much harder for cities to raise taxes from any 
sources. The beverage industry dropped the initiative after 
lawmakers agreed to their proposed SSB tax moratorium.47 
At the meeting of the Academy of Nutrition and Dietetics, 
the two largest exhibits belonged to PepsiCo and Ocean Spray, 
both of which sell sweetened drinks. The Academy still casts 
doubt on evidence that SSB tax improves health. 
Conclusion and Recommendation 
This review shows that tactics used by the alcohol and 
unhealthy food industries48 are similar to the four most 
common approaches used by the tobacco industry.49 All 
interfere with the legislative process to prevent the adoption 
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of control measures; use front groups to act on their behalf; 
question the evidence of their product harm and the 
effectiveness of interventions; and aim to appear responsible 
in the eyes of the public, journalists and policy-makers. Trade 
agreements provide platforms for industries to introduce legal 
challenges and undermine government measures to control 
tobacco and alcohol, for example, trademark protections and 
other technical barriers to trade.50
These tactics can be especially effective in the context of 
poor governance, rampant corruption, conflict of interests 
among political and government actors, as well as regulatory 
captures.51 Similar interference is also reported from high-
income countries52,53 where there are more capacities and 
resources to counteract. 
Not only good governance, but effective mechanisms 
to counteract conflict of interests among political and 
government actors, and prevent regulatory capture are also 
needed.54,55 The WHO Framework of Engagement with 
non-State Actors56 can be applied to country contexts when 
engaging with private entities in the prevention and control 
of NCDs. Strengthening the capacities of government lawyers 
to defend lawsuits by industries and take litigating against law 
violations is also critical.57
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